The Cincinnati Post published its last edition on New Year's Eve 2007, leaving the Cincinnati Enquirer as the only daily newspaper in the market. The next year, fewer candidates ran for municipal office in the Kentucky suburbs most reliant on the Post, incumbents became more likely to win reelection, and voter turnout and campaign spending fell. These changes happened even though the Enquirer at least temporarily increased its coverage of the Post's former strongholds. Voter turnout remained depressed through 2010, nearly three years after the Post closed, but the other effects diminished with time. We exploit a difference-in-differences strategy and the fact that the Post's closing date was fixed 30 years in advance to rule out some non-causal explanations for our results. Although our findings are statistically imprecise, they demonstrate that newspaperseven underdogs such as the Post, which had a circulation of just 27,000 when it closed -can have a substantial and measurable impact on public life.
"Give light and the people will find their own way." -motto of the E.W. Scripps Co., owner of The Cincinnati Post
Introduction
A century ago, 689 cities in the United States had competing daily newspapers; by 2008, only 15 did, and today that number has fallen to 11.
1 Many monopoly newspapers are also struggling financially. The decline in competition and in the newspaper industry as a whole has prompted concern that the nation is losing a crucial source of information about public affairs. In the words of one observer, "More of American life will occur in shadows.
We won't know what we won't know."
2 This paper offers a case study of the consequences of closing a newspaper. The Cincinnati Post published its last edition Dec. 31, 2007 , leaving the Cincinnati Enquirer as the only daily newspaper covering Cincinnati and its suburbs in southern Ohio and northern Kentucky.
The closing was particularly important in the northern Kentucky suburbs, where the Post historically dominated circulation and, as we document, provided more than 80 percent of the combined local news coverage in the two papers. We use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that the Post's closing made municipal politics in the Kentucky suburbs less competitive along several dimensions: Fewer people voted in elections for city council, city commission, and school board; fewer candidates sought those seats; the remaining candidates spent less money on their campaigns; and, for councils and commissions, incumbents' chances of retaining office improved. These changes happened even though the Enquirer at least temporarily increased its coverage of the Post's former strongholds. The differences appeared immediately after the Post closed; in the case of voter turnout, the impact persisted through the 2010 general election, nearly three years later, while the other effects diminished with time.
We do not report analyses of election results in the Ohio suburbs because the Post largely withdrew from covering these suburbs as early as 2001 (Philipps, 2007; Rutledge, 2007) , implying that the closing itself would not be expected to have much impact in Ohio.
3
In results not reported here, we apply to the Ohio suburbs the same methods used in this paper to analyze the Kentucky suburbs and estimate a negative effect of the Post's closing on political activity in Ohio, but the effect is statistically insignificant and much less precisely estimated than the already imprecise estimates in Kentucky.
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Our results shed light on two important public policy concerns. First, our findings suggest that even a small newspaper -the Post sold about 27,000 copies daily in 2007, compared with 200,000 for the Enquirer -can make local politics more vibrant. Although competing publications or other media such as TV, radio, and the Internet may take up some slack when a newspaper closes, none of these appears so far to have fully filled the Post's role in municipal politics in northern Kentucky. Our findings confirm the fears of community leaders such as Boone County Judge-Executive Gary Moore, who said on learning of the Post's impending closure: "I'm very concerned about Northern Kentucky news getting to our constituents. The Post has done a wonderful job through the years of being the daily informant of what's going on in the community to our residents" (Duke, 2007) . To the extent that our findings apply beyond Cincinnati, they also suggest that local politics will become less competitive after closures of the much larger second newspapers in cities such as Denver Second, the Post, an afternoon newspaper whose weekday circulation fell nearly 90 percent in its last 30 years, 5 survived as long as it did thanks to an implicit government sub-3 By 2007, just 30 percent of the Post's weekday circulation was in Ohio, even though three-quarters of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Statistical Area's population is in Ohio; on weekdays the Post reached just 2.4 percent of households in Hamilton County (which includes Cincinnati), compared with 13.9 percent of households in Kenton County and 16 percent of households in Campbell County in Kentucky (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2007) . 4 We do not analyze elections in Ohio around the time that the Post reduced its coverage there because, unlike the timing of the paper's closing, the timing of the coverage reduction in Ohio was not predetermined and may have been endogenous. We also cannot use the Ohio suburbs as a control group for comparison with the Kentucky suburbs because Ohio and Kentucky hold municipal elections in different years.
5 According to the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook , the Post's Ohio and Kentucky editions had newspapers that are in "economic distress" can obtain an exemption from antitrust laws and form a joint operating agreement (JOA) that charges monopoly prices for subscriptions and advertising, as long as the papers retain independent newsrooms. The Post and the Enquirer formed a JOA in 1977. In passing the act, Congress determined that the value for democracy of preserving independent editorial voices outweighed the potential deadweight losses from monopoly pricing. 6 As then-Rep. Spark Matsunaga, Democrat of Hawaii and a sponsor of the act, put it in House debate: "Let us make no mistake about it, we are here being forced into making a choice between preserving a free press as opposed to keeping the sanctity of the antitrust laws. In a democratic society such as ours the choice is obvious -the free press must be preserved" (Matsunaga, 1970) . Despite the explicit congressional rationale for the Newspaper Preservation Act, and even though 27 JOAs have existed over the years, ours is the first analysis we know of to measure the political impact of preserving competition through a JOA.
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total Monday-to-Friday circulation of 246,323 in 1977. The decline was linear with time. The Enquirer 's weekday circulation in 1977 was 190,407. 6 Newspapers in a JOA also combine their printing and delivery operations to exploit economies of scale, but publishers can obtain these savings without an antitrust exemption so long as they continue to compete in advertising and subscription sales.
7 An existing literature investigates the effect of JOAs on newspaper content and profits (see, e.g., Busterna and Picard, 1993) .
The JOA between the Post and the Enquirer is central to our empirical strategy. ended so far, 17 ended early when the owners decided that publishing two newspapers was unprofitable and closed one paper or merged the two papers together. The other four lapsed or were dissolved with both newspapers continuing to publish.) The Enquirer 's owner, Gannett (Baldasty, 1999; Stevens, 1968) . The family-controlled media chain's headquarters remain in Cincinnati, and many corporate executives once worked in the Post newsroom. But even if Scripps' decision has an explanation other than historical sentiment, it seems unlikely that Scripps chose the Post's exact closing date near the actual time of the closing. 9 Rather, the JOA partners picked a date 30 years in advance, and the Post closed on that date because it was the default 8 Full disclosure: The first author worked from 1998 to 1999 at the Birmingham (Ala.) Post-Herald , a Scripps newspaper that participated in a JOA and later closed.
9 Scripps has not publicly explained the timing of its decision to close the Post.
outcome if the partners never changed the agreement.
Because the Post's closing date was fixed so far in advance, changes in local politics after early 2004 -when Gannett announced it would not renew the JOA -cannot have caused the paper to close exactly when it did. Third factors such as short-run municipalitylevel economic fluctuations that might affect both local politics and the paper's viability are also less likely to be responsible for the timing of the closing, though Scripps perhaps would have kept the paper open if the towns it covered had experienced a sudden economic boom. Therefore, we can more plausibly attribute changes in political outcomes after the Post closed to the paper's closing instead of some other source. To help rule out the possibility that the political changes occurred for other reasons and only randomly coincided with the Post's closure, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy, comparing changes in political outcomes before and after the closure in suburbs that received relatively more or less coverage from the paper. Suburbs that received less coverage serve as controls representing the likely change over time if the Post had never existed. We also account for the possibility that papers. Waldfogel (2006, 2008) show that competition from The New York Times reduces local papers' circulation among highly educated readers and makes those readers less likely to vote. Adserà et al. (2003) show that states and countries with higher newspaper circulation per capita have less corruption. Mondak (1995) persists in the present-day market environment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes our data, section 3 lays out our empirical strategy and results, and section 4 concludes.
Data
Our analysis covers all 48 incorporated municipalities in seven Kentucky counties:
Boone, Campbell, and Kenton, which formed the core of the Post's Kentucky circulation area, as well as Bracken, Gallatin, Grant, and Pendleton, which border the core counties. 
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The main experimental study is Gerber et al., which uses a randomized controlled trial to measure the effect of receiving a newspaper subscription. However, the impact of receiving a newspaper can differ from the impact of the newspaper's existence if readers tell nonreaders about stories or if politicians behave differently when a newspaper might write about them.
11 Our sample excludes the former city of Latonia Lakes, Kenton County, which was dissolved in 2006. 12 We exclude mayoral elections because only three municipalities in our sample held mayoral elections in 2008.
A. Newspaper coverage
We use the 2003 to 2007 Post and Enquirer story counts to construct an index of the Post's importance in covering each municipality: the fraction of stories about that municipality that appeared in the Post. This index is a useful measure of the Post's role because, all else equal, communities where the Post's share of coverage was higher lost more coverage when the Post closed. (We cannot base our analysis on circulation data because independent dealers delivered the Post and the paper had no centralized list of subscribers' addresses. We also cannot use the Audit Bureau of Circulations' zip-code-level data because some towns in our sample share zip codes. Regardless, because broadcasters and bloggers often quote newspaper stories, the number of stories a paper publishes may matter more than the number of subscribers: One subscriber with a well-read blog or popular broadcast can multiply a story's impact many times. Such repetition may help explain how the Post could have a meaningful political impact despite its low circulation.) The Post's share of coverage is highly serially 13 We include the county name as well as the municipality name in the searches to avoid counting irrelevant stories that would otherwise appear for municipalities with generic names such as Union. To see whether certain kinds of stories disproportionately include the county name, we picked two municipalities at random and performed searches with and without their respective county names. We found no salient differences in the content of stories with and without county names. We also found that the searches with county names returned very few irrelevant stories.
The Post published both an Ohio edition and a Kentucky edition, with some stories appearing in both editions. In general, the Kentucky edition provides a more accurate measure of coverage in Kentucky. However, every Kentucky-edition story appears in our searches for the city of Covington because the Post's Kentucky reporters were based there. Therefore, for all municipalities except Covington, we count stories in the Kentucky edition. For 
B. Political outcomes
News coverage potentially influences election outcomes in many ways. By revealing incumbents' misdeeds or making it easier for challengers to get their message out, a newspaper may reduce incumbent advantage (Trounstine, 2009) . Alternatively, if newspaper stories increase incumbents' name recognition (Snyder and Strömberg, 2010) , then a newspaper 14 http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/enquirer/search.html could increase incumbent advantage. Newspaper stories could also raise interest in politics or make citizens feel more connected to their communities, thus inspiring more people to vote or run for office. In addition, the closure of a newspaper could change campaign spending.
Candidates may spend less if reduced competition lowers the need to advertise, or spend more if they must use paid ads to substitute for the free newspaper coverage they received previously.
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To measure these aspects of political engagement and competition, we obtained elec- Many other outcomes are also potentially of interest but would be difficult to study in the context of Kentucky municipal elections. For example, we cannot study party affiliation, because nearly all candidates are nonpartisan. We also cannot study victory margins, because most races involve multiple candidates competing for multiple seats, with voters allowed to cast multiple votes, so that strategic voting is possible and vote totals do not necessarily reflect the strength of voters' preferences. with local elections because people who vote for national but not for local offices will not affect our estimate of local voters. (People who vote for local offices but would not have come to the polls without a national election can still influence our results, however. For this reason, our empirical analysis controls for whether the election took place in a presidential election year.) Because election records do not show the actual number of voters in a given race, we construct our estimate of the number of local voters in two steps. For each local race on the ballot, we estimate the number of voters casting ballots in that race as the larger of the most votes received by any candidate or the ratio of total votes cast to the number of votes allowed per voter in that race. We then estimate the number of voters in all local races by the maximum across races of the number of voters in each race. There is no municipal-level data on voting-age population after 2000 for the small suburbs in our sample, so we use the number of voters as a proxy for turnout rates.
Our second measure is the ratio of candidates for local office to seats up for election.
For each municipality and year, we count the people whose names appeared on a primary or general election ballot. We divide this number by the number of seats up for election.
Our third measure is the fraction of seats in a municipality that incumbents win in a given year. We measure incumbent advantage by the fraction of seats won by incumbents rather than by the difference in probabilities of winning for nonincumbents and incumbents conditional on running because unpopular incumbents might not seek reelection. In that case, incumbents who appeared on the ballot would have a high probability of winning even if voters were, in effect, throwing out many other incumbents. Election records do not identify incumbents, so we determine whether a candidate is an incumbent by checking whether that candidate won the previous election for the same office. We verified a random sample of the results by contacting officeholders and found that our method was accurate. Because our election data start in 2004, this method allows us to identify incumbents starting in 2006 for city council and city commission seats, which have two-year terms. We do not examine incumbent advantage in school board elections, because these elections are for four-year terms and our data would allow us to identify school board incumbency starting only in 2008, after the Post closed.
Our fourth measure is campaign spending per candidate: the total campaign spending recorded in the election finance registry for all school board, council, and commission candidates in a municipality in a given year, divided by the number of candidates. We deflate the data to constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index. suburbs remained stable in the first year after the Post closed and then fell dramatically.
C. Describing the data
However, other factors may also have changed from year to year -for example, the 2008 presidential election had unusually high turnout -and influenced election outcomes or Enquirer coverage. Our task in the next section is to examine how the Post's closure affected outcomes, holding other factors constant.
Empirical strategy and results
Our basic model for the effect of Post coverage on an outcome y it in municipality i in year t is
where Post Share i is the Post's share of all stories about community i in the period before the Post shut down; Post Closed t is an indicator for whether the Post had closed as of date t; x i represents demographic characteristics of the municipality; and it is all factors other than postshare that affect the outcome. The coefficient θ 1 is the effect of closing the Post on outcome y in a community that received all its news coverage from the Post; a positive value of θ 1 implies that closing the Post raised outcome y in communities where the Post provided a large share of coverage, compared with communities where the Post provided less coverage.
We use the Post's share of stories instead of the total number of stories in the Post as our measure of the Post's importance in covering a municipality because larger municipalities may tend to have more stories in both newspapers. Taking the ratio of stories in the two papers controls for the overall level of coverage while limiting the number of regressors, which is desirable because we have data on only 48 municipalities. We calculate Post Share i as the average over 2004-2007 of the Post's share of stories in each year. Averaging helps to remove year-to-year fluctuations that might result from random news events but do not reflect true changes in the Post's importance for a community. In addition, averaging guarantees that we use the same measure of the Post's importance for all years that it was open, so we are identifying the effect of the paper's closing rather than the effect of short-run fluctuations in
Post and Enquirer coverage while both papers were open.
Our model controls for a variety of factors other than Post coverage that could affect election outcomes. The municipality fixed effects α i account for time-invariant unobservable differences across municipalities, such as permanent differences in voters' interest in politics.
The year fixed effects θ 0,t account for unobservable differences across years that affect all municipalities equally, such as any national political events that have the same influence on all voters. Finally, the interaction of year effects with demographics x i θ 2,t accounts for differences in how national events affect places with different observable demographics.
To understand how equation (1) (1) by taking first differences. If we subtract equation (1) for 2004 . Because Scripps appears not to have set the closing date based on contemporaneous economic trends, we think this type of correlation is unlikely to be a problem.
Other sources of correlation may remain, however. Although the municipality fixed effects α i and year fixed effects θ 0,t remove any permanent characteristics of municipalities and any differences between years that affected all municipalities equally, the municipality and year fixed effects cannot remove differences between the years that affected some municipalities more than others. Our leading concern is that Barack Obama's historic presidential Some municipalities might also have unobservably different trends in factors that affect the outcomes we study -for example, population growth rates might vary across municipalities -and these differences might be correlated with Post coverage. Therefore, in some specifications, we control for this possibility by adding municipality-specific trends to the model:
Another concern is that any unobserved factor i,2004 that affected politics in 2004 could 17 We find marginally statistically significant evidence that the Post's share was higher in communities where a larger share of the voting-age population is black or ages 18 to 34. Instrumenting for the Post's share can also reduce attenuation bias in the estimate of θ 1 if the Post's share in any given year is a noisy measurement of the paper's true long-run importance in a community.
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We weight all of our estimates by the municipality's voting-age population (measured in 2000). There are both statistical and policy grounds for weighting. From a statistical perspective, all of our outcomes except number of voters are averages, so random fluctuations in outcomes will likely be larger in smaller municipalities, and the efficient estimator will weight by population. From a policy perspective, policy-makers may care more about outcomes in places where more people live. The appendix shows that -except in a few cases that we highlight below -our qualitative results are robust to calculating the estimates without weights. Table 3 presents the results. On all four measures of political engagement and competition, we find indications that the Post's closure made elections less competitive:
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Number of voters: In all specifications, our estimates show that relatively fewer people went to the polls after the Post closed in places where the Post was more important. The point estimates are large: The Post's closing is estimated to reduce the number of voters by between 59 percent (1 − e −0.88 ) and 92 percent (1 − e −2.55 ) in a municipality where 19 The measurement error in the Post's share appears to be classical: If postshare it is the Post's share in community i in year t, we find that corr(postshare it , postshare is ) does not depend on t − s for t = s, consistent with a model where postshare it = trueshare i + u it with i.i.d. u it .
20 In an earlier version of this paper that examined only the short-run impact of the Post's closing, we also considered specifications that accounted for the limited range of the dependent variables. (For example, campaign spending is left-censored at zero, and no matter how big or small incumbents' advantage is, the probability of an incumbent victory cannot exceed one or fall below zero.) We found that the results were generally similar to those obtained with ordinary least squares estimation of (1). However, the limiteddependent-variable estimators do not let us use an instrument for Post Share i , so we do not employ them in this version. the Post provided all coverage, compared with a municipality where the Post provided no coverage. Notice, though, that the range of Post Share is substantially smaller than zero to one. Our estimates will not reflect nonlinearities in the effect of Post Share outside the observed range. The standard deviation of Post Share is 0.10; thus, for each one-standard-deviation increase in the Post's share of coverage, the Post's closing reduced the number of voters by between 8.4 percent (1 − e −0.88×0.1 ) and 22.5 percent
(1 − e −2.55×0.1 ). Because our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of voters, we can interpret our results as describing the effect on turnout rates: Changes in the voting-age population, which is unobserved but is the denominator of the turnout rate, will enter the error term of (1), and our estimates will be unbiased if the population growth rate is uncorrelated with the Post's coverage share. 21 The effect is statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level in both OLS and IV specifications when we do not include municipality-specific trends. Controlling for municipality-specific trends makes both the point estimates and standard errors larger, so that the effect is not always statistically significant. The appendix shows that we obtain similar results, slightly smaller in magnitude but with larger standard errors, when we do not weight by population.
Number of candidates:
Relatively fewer people ran for office after the Post closed in places where the Post was more important. According to the estimates that do not control for municipality-specific trends, for each one-standard-deviation increase in the Post's share, the paper's closing reduced the ratio of candidates to seats by between 0.03 and 0.11. In most specifications, the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The appendix shows that the estimated effect is smaller but still negative when we do not weight by population.
Incumbent advantage: Incumbent advantage rose after the Post closed in places where the Post was more important. According to the estimates that do not control for municipality-specific trends, for each one-standard-deviation increase in the Post's share, the paper's closing raised incumbent advantage by between 7 and 10 percentage points. The point estimates are generally slightly larger than the standard errors but are not statistically significant. This is the sole outcome for which the choice of weights matters for our qualitative results: The appendix shows that if we do not weight by population, then the Post's closing reduced incumbent advantage.
Campaign spending: Candidates spent relatively less money on their campaigns after the Post closed in places where the newspaper was more important. For each one-standarddeviation increase in the Post's share, the paper's closing reduced spending by between $177 and $1,469 per candidate. The result suggests that the lower need for spending in less-competitive elections outweighed the potential need to buy campaign ads to replace newspaper coverage. The estimated effect is surprisingly large relative to average spending, but because average spending includes many candidates who spent no money, the estimated effect is more plausible compared with the average spending of candidates who reported positive spending. As with the other outcomes, the largest point estimates come when we control for municipality-specific trends. The point estimates are usually larger than the standard errors but not statistically significant. The appendix shows that the estimated effect is an order of magnitude smaller, but still negative, when we do not weight by population. In regressions not reported here, we also found a consistently negative effect of the Post's closure on spending when the dependent variable was total spending or the natural logarithm of spending.
Controlling for race and age structure proves not to affect the qualitative results, though the magnitudes of the coefficients change in some cases. In regressions not reported here, we obtained similar results when we controlled only for race and when we controlled for adult population in addition to race and age structure. The small sample size makes the dangers of specification searching particularly high, so we deliberately did not experiment with other controls. For all outcomes, controlling for municipality-specific trends makes the estimated effects larger in magnitude; thus, our results are not driven by unobserved differences in trends between municipalities where the Post played a larger or smaller role.
The impact of the Post's closing could be larger in the short run than in the long run if it takes some time for other media to replace the Post's coverage. Our estimates of
(1) would obscure this possibility by averaging together short-run outcomes from 2008 (less than a year after the paper closed) with long-run outcomes from 2010 (nearly three years after the closing). We investigate whether the short-run and long-run impacts are different by estimating an equation with separate short-run and long-run coefficients:
In equation (3) Note that if we include municipality-specific trends in (3), identification requires data on at least two years before the Post closed; thus, when we estimate (3), we cannot include municipality-specific trends for the incumbent-advantage outcome, for which we have data in only one pre-closing year. Table 4 shows the results from estimating (3). In almost all specifications, the standard errors are large and we cannot reject the hypothesis that short-run and long-run effects are equal. However, some general patterns appear in the point estimates. When we examine the number of voters, the short-run and long-run effects of the Post's closing are similar;
if anything, we estimate that the closing depressed turnout more in the long run than in the short run. For all other outcomes, however, the short-run effects are generally larger in magnitude than the long-run effects, and in a few specifications, the long-run effects change sign. The point estimates thus suggest that the Post's closing had a long-lived effect on voter turnout but that the impacts on the number of candidates, incumbent advantage, and campaign spending diminished with time.
In table 5, we use equation (3) 
Conclusion
The logo of the E.W. Scripps Co., printed on the front page of all its newspapers, is a lighthouse. This paper describes what happened when one of Scripps' lights went out.
The Cincinnati Post was a relatively small newspaper, with circulation of only 27,000 when it closed. Nonetheless, its absence appears to have made local elections less competitive along several dimensions: incumbent advantage, voter turnout, campaign spending, and the number of candidates for office. The effect on voter turnout persisted for several years after the newspaper closed. We caution, however, that while our preferred point estimates tell a compelling story, the results are statistically imprecise and sometimes sensitive to the use of weights. In addition, this paper is a case study of the closing of one newspaper; future research could investigate the consequences of closings of other newspapers, though a significant challenge is to find an exogenous or at least predetermined closing.
Several other well-known newspapers have closed since the Post -the largest being 
